Abstract-It is a well-known fact that feedback does not increase the capacity of point-to-point memoryless channels, however, its effect in secure communications is not fully understood yet. In this work, two achievable schemes for the wiretap channel with generalized feedback are presented. The first scheme, which uses the feedback signal to generate a shared secret key between the legitimate users, encrypts the message to be sent at the bit level. The second scheme, which is based on joint source-channel coding, correlates the codewords to be transmitted with the feedback signal in the hope of "hiding" them from the eavesdropper's observations. The first achievable scheme provides new capacity results for a class of channels as well as some new insights into the secret key agreement problem. Moreover, these results recover previously reported rate regions from the literature and thus, they can be seen as a generalization that unifies several results in the field.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there has been great interest in the study of the wiretap channel (WTC) [3] as a model for secure communications against eavesdroppers by harnessing the randomness inherently present in the physical medium (see [4] and references therein). Application to secure wireless networks is extremely attractive, not only because the open nature of the medium makes communication devices particularly sensitive to eavesdropping, but also because randomness is abundantly available in such scenarios. As a matter of fact, the current theory of physical layer security indicates that securing part of the data can be provided at minimal -or even no-cost in the total throughput.
A crucial observation behind this promising result is that unless the legitimate and the eavesdropper channels enjoy different statistical properties, which is often a nonrealistic assumption, secrecy cannot be guaranteed. Nevertheless, if both channels share the same statistical properties but some extra outdated side information is available at the transmitter, This work was partially supported by the FP7 Network of Excellence in Wireless COMmunications NEWCOM#. The material in this paper was presented in part at the 2015 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, Jun. 2015 [1] , and at the 2015 IEEE Information Theory Workshop, Oct. 2015 [2] .
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Alice then the encoder can create the asymmetry required to ensure security (e.g., see [5] , [6] ). In fact, this observation reveals one of the major limitations of the wiretap model whose performance strongly depends on the amount of outdated side information that may be available at the transmitter. Studying the impact on secrecy systems of different types of instantaneous information is therefore of both practical and theoretical interest.
In this work, we investigate the problem where a node, Alice, wishes to secretly communicate a message to another node, Bob, in presence of a passive eavesdropper, Eve, as depicted in Fig. 1 . Alice can communicate with Bob using a general memoryless channel but Eve is listening this communication through another memoryless channel, whose statistical properties can be different or equal to Bob's. In addition, we assume that Alice observes general -may be noisy-outdated feedback which is correlated to the channel outputs of Bob and Eve, referred to as "generalized feedback". It is worth mentioning that this feedback model is rich enough since it handles several different types of outdated side information at the transmitter (e.g., delayed state-feedback or noisy feedback of the channel outputs) as well as both secure and non-secure feedback scenarios. Therefore, the generalized feedback model provides the adequate framework to investigate the impact of the feedback model.
A. Related Work
There has been substantial work on the wiretap channel with different feedback models, however, the capacity in the general case remains unresolved. Feedback, even partial, is known to increase the capacity of several multi-terminal networks with respect to the non-feedback case (e.g., broadcast [7] and multiple access channels [8] ). The transmitter uses the feedback signal to provide the decoder with noisy functions of the channel noise or parameters, and the messages. This communication is accomplished by two fundamentally different classes of coding schemes: those based on block Markov (digital) coding [7] , [8] , and those based on linear (analog) encoding [9] , known as Schalkwijk-Kailath (SK) scheme, which perform well over additive Gaussian models.
In the literature, there exist two complementary approaches on the use of the feedback signal to secure the communication. On the first one, Alice and Bob extract common randomness from their respective channel output which they use as a shared secret key. This key encrypts the message at the bit level which provides secrecy as long as Eve cannot obtain the key. On the second approach, Alice relies on a "feedbackdependent codebook" that correlates the codewords to be sent with the feedback signal. In this way, Alice seeks to hide as much as possible the transmitted codewords from Eve's observations (e.g., beamforming at the codeword level). Due to the inherently digital nature of encrypting the message bitwise, only the block Markov scheme is suited for the first approach, while both block Markov and SK schemes are possible for the second approach.
Results based on the secret key approach are numerous, as it seems natural to use the feedback link (secure or not) to agree upon a key. In [10] , the authors analyze the WTC with perfect output feedback only at the encoder and propose a scheme based on this approach. This scheme achieves the capacity of the degraded, i.e., X − − Y − − Z, and reversely degraded, i.e., X − − Z − − Y , WTC with perfect output feedback. The case of parallel channels, i.e., Y − − X − − Z, is studied in [11] , where secrecy capacity is found when one of the channels is more capable than the other. A similar model to [10] , where the feedback link is in fact a secure rate-limited channel from Bob to Alice, is presented in [12] . In contrast to the previous schemes, the key is here created with fresh randomness that Bob sends.
The use of state-feedback as a means to generate a key has also been analyzed, either when it is known only by the legitimate users [13] or by all the nodes in the network [14] . The authors of [13] propose a lower bound for the general discrete memoryless WTC with state information at both the encoder and decoder, which is tight in several scenarios, e.g., when Bob is less noisy than Eve, or when Eve is less noisy than Bob and the channel is independent of the state. In [14] , the authors study a communication scenario where an encoder transmits private messages to several receivers through a broadcast erasure channel, and the receivers feedback (publicly) their channel states. Capacity is characterized based on linear complexity two-phase schemes: in the first phase appropriate secret keys are generated which are exploited during the second phase to encrypt each message.
Indeed, the generation of the secret key is a problem in and of itself [15] , [16] . Two models exist that tackle this issue: the "source model", when the generation is based on the common randomness present in correlated sources, and the "channel model", when the common randomness is due to the correlation between inputs and outputs of the channel. The authors of [17] study the first model, where two nodes generate common randomness with the aid of a third "helper" node, all of them connected by noiseless rate-limited links. This common randomness may be kept secret from a fourth passive node that acts as an eavesdropper. More recently, [18] investigates the situation where there is no helper node, the users communicate over a WTC, and a public discussion channel may or may not be available. On the other hand, [19] analyzes key agreement over a multiple access channel, i.e., the channel model. Here the receiver can actively send feedback, through a noiseless or noisy link, to increase the size of the shared key.
Results based on the "feedback-dependent codebook" approach, however, are not that numerous to the best of our knowledge. Early work in [20] , [21] study the multiple access channel (MAC) with generalized feedback and secrecy constraints. In [20] the eavesdropper is an external user to the MAC and the cooperating encoders use (partial) decode-andforward strategies to enlarge their achievable rates. On the other hand, in [21] , each encoder acts as an eavesdropper for the other user and the authors propose lower bounds based on compress-and-forward to increase the transmission rates to levels that are only decodable by the destination. Completely outdated state-feedback can also be used to enhance security. In [5] , [6] , it is shown that outdated state-feedback of either the legitimate channel, the eavesdropper's channel or both, increases the secure degrees of freedom (SDoF) of the twouser Gaussian multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) wiretap channel.
Active feedback in a half-duplex fashion is used in [22] , where communication is split in two phases. In the first one, the destination sends a random codeword which cannot be decoded by the eavesdropper. On top of this "interference sequence", the codeword to be transmitted in the second phase is superimposed. This scheme achieves positive secrecy rates in the MIMO wiretap channel even when the eavesdropper has more antennas than the source. An analogous scheme is presented for the full-duplex two-way Gaussian wiretap channel in [23] . Here, the interference sequence sent in the first phase is canceled at the eavesdropper thanks to the fullduplex operation of the channel. Moreover, the authors show that neglecting the feedback signal can lead to unbounded loss in achievable rate under certain conditions.
In [24] , the modulo-additive WTC with a full-duplex destination node is investigated. The authors propose a scheme where the legitimate receiver injects noise in the backward (feedback) channel, effectively eliminating any correlation between the message sent and the eavesdropper's observation. This scheme achieves the full capacity of the point-to-point channel in absence of the wiretapper, i.e., full secrecy can be guaranteed at no rate cost. A similar conclusion is also drawn in [25] , where the authors analyze an additive white Gaussian noisy (AWGN) channel with perfect output feedback from the legitimate receiver. They propose an SK-based coding scheme which achieves the full capacity of the AWGN channel in absence of the wiretapper, as long as the eavesdropper only has access to a noisy feedback signal.
A closely related topic to the one addressed in this work is the WTC with noncausal side-information available to the parties. The model where the side-information is only available at the encoder is studied in [26] , where an inner bound based on Gelfand and Pinsker's strategy for channels with state [27] is introduced. An extension to this model, with both the encoder and legitimate decoder having access to correlated side-information, is investigated in [28] . More recently, the authors of [29] analyze a slightly different scenario where the state affecting the legitimate decoder's channel is not equal to the one affecting the eavesdropper's channel. These channel states are correlated and the encoder only knows the state of the legitimate decoder's channel.
B. Contributions and Organization of the Paper
In this work, we present two different inner bounds on the capacity of the memoryless wiretap channel with generalized feedback, using the two different approaches mentioned earlier. In particular, we derive the following results:
• We first introduce our main contribution (see Theorem 1), an inner bound based on the secret key approach, where the feedback link is used to generate a key that encrypts the message partially or completely.
• As a corollary to Theorem 1, we derive an inner bound (see Corollary 1) on secret key agreement for the same channel model. The channel is used both as a source of correlated randomness and as a means of communication, i.e., there is no parallel public noiseless channel used by the terminals.
• We then present a second inner bound (see Theorem 2) that is based on the use of joint source-channel coding, which introduces time dependencies between the noisy feedback and the channel inputs through different blocks.
• In order to assess the optimality of these strategies, we derive outer bounds for a particular class of channels (see Theorems 3 and 4) and we show that the first inner bound and its corollary are optimal under some special conditions (see Propositions 1 to 6). These results provide novel capacity rate regions.
• In addition to these new capacity results, both inner bounds are shown to recover previously reported results for different channel and feedback models (see Theorems 5 to 8). Consequently, the inner bounds provided in this work can be seen as a generalization and thus unification of several results in the field. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the general channel model and the one used for the capacity results, as well as some basic definitions. In Section III, we present our main results: the inner and outer bounds, whose proofs are deferred to the appendices. The new capacity results and the comparison with previously reported inner bounds are shown in Section IV, while the summary and concluding remarks are stated in Section V.
Notation and Conventions
Throughout this work, we use the standard notation of [30] . Specifically, given two integers i and j, the expression [i : j] denotes the set {i, i + 1, . . . , j}, whereas for real values a and b, [a, b] denotes the closed interval between a and b. Lowercase letters such as x and y are mainly used to represent constants or realizations of random variables, whereas capital letters such as X and Y stand for the random variables in itself. Bold capital letters such as H H H and Q Q Q represent matrices, while calligraphic letters such as X and Y are reserved for sets, codebooks or special functions.
The probability distribution (PD) of the random vector X n , p X n (x n ), is succinctly written as p(x n ) without subscript when it can be understood from the argument x n . Given three random variables X, Y , and Z, if its joint PD can be decomposed as p(xyz) = p(y)p(x|y)p(z|y), then they form a Markov chain, denoted by X − − Y − − Z. Entropy is denoted by H(·), differential entropy, h(·), and mutual information, I(·; ·). The expression C[x] = 1 2 log 2 (1 + x) stands for the capacity of a Gaussian channel with SNR of value x, and |x| + denotes max{x, 0}. Definitions and properties of strongly typical sequences and delta-convention are provided in Appendix A.
We use the notation x j i = (x i , x i+1 , . . . , x j ) to denote the sequence of length j − i + 1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ j. If i = 1, we drop the subscript for succinctness, i.e., x j = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x j ). In the rest of the article, we deal primarily with double-indexed sequences where, unless noted otherwise, the indices j ∈ [1 : b] and i ∈ [1 : n] correspond to the block index and the time index inside a block, respectively. We shall give briefly some examples of this notation, where the block index is in brackets:
denotes the value of x in time slot i inside block j;
) is a vector with the first i values of x of block j;
) is a vector with the values of x in time slot i for the first j blocks; 
II. PROBLEM DEFINITION
In this work, we consider primarily the wiretap channel with generalized feedback. Nonetheless, we also provide some insights on a specific class of channels that can be derived from the original system model. We now introduce these two models.
A. Wiretap Channel with Generalized Feedback
In the wiretap channel with generalized feedback, a source wants to transmit a message M n ∈ M n securely to a destination with the aid of a feedback signal while an eavesdropper is present in the channel. The WTC with generalized feedback, depicted in Fig. 1 , is modeled as a memoryless channel defined by a conditional probability distribution
where x ∈ X is the source's channel input,ŷ ∈Ŷ is the feedback signal, and y ∈ Y and z ∈ Z are the legitimate receiver's and eavesdropper's channel outputs, respectively. Definition 1: A secrecy rate R is said to be achievable for this channel if for every (ǫ n , ǫ ′ n ) > 0 there exists a block length n, M n ≥ 2 n(R−ǫn) , randomized encoder functions
The secrecy capacity C sf of the WTC with generalized feedback is the supremum of all achievable secrecy rates.
In this work, we also consider the situation where the source does not want to transmit a message but rather agree on a secret key with the legitimate decoder while keeping it private from the eavesdropper. The channel outputs, i.e., y, y, and z, may be seen as correlated sources. This scenario is called "channel model" for key agreement, but in our case, the communication also takes place in the same channel rather than in a separate noiseless public broadcast channel.
Given the strictly causal nature of the feedback link, for each time slot i, the encoder uses its past observations to generate a symbol ϕ i (Ŷ i−1 ) that sends through the channel. After n time slots, both the encoder and the legitimate decoder generate a secret key, i.e.,
, where K n ,K n ∈ K n . Both encoding functions ϕ i (·) and the key generation function ψ a (·) might be stochastic in order to increase the size of the key.
Definition 2: A secret key of rate R k is said to be achievable for this channel if for every (ǫ n , ǫ
, and ψ b (·) such that the preceding steps can be fulfilled and Pr K n =K n ≤ ǫ n , and I(K n ; Z n ) ≤ nǫ ′ n , where ǫ n and ǫ ′ n are sequences that (ǫ n , ǫ ′ n ) → 0 as n → ∞. The secret key capacity C kf of the WTC with generalized feedback is the supremum of all achievable secret key rates.
B. Wiretap Channel with Parallel Sources
The channel model (1) is general enough to encompass different special scenarios; one of them, that we use later in the derivation of our capacity results, is depicted in Fig. 2 . This model is a WTC without channel feedback where each node has causal access to correlated sources; in particular, Alice, Bob, and Eve observeŶ s , Y s , and Z s , respectively. The sources are i.i.d. and independent of the main channel's outputs (Y c , Z c ) and input X c . The new model may thus be defined based on the original one by the specific set of variablesŶ
with the following probability distribution Definition 1 about achievable secrecy rate and secrecy capacity (C s ), and Definition 2 about achievable secret key rate and secret key capacity (C k ), may be readily extended to this new model using the set of variables (2).
III. SUMMARY OF MAIN RESULTS
We present the main results of this work in the sequel. The proofs of these results are deferred to the appendices.
A. Wiretap Channel with Generalized Feedback

1) Secrecy Rate Inner Bound Based on Key Generation:
We first introduce our main contribution, a coding scheme that allows the legitimate users to agree on a secret key simultaneously with the transmission of a message. The secret key is generated by virtue of the feedback link and is later used to encrypt at the bit level the next message to be sent.
Equipped with this inner bound, we provide in Section IV new capacity results and we recover previous ones found in the literature.
Theorem 1 (KG inner bound):
An inner bound on the secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel with generalized feedback is given by the region
where R KG1 (p) is the set of all nonnegative rates satisfying
whereas R KG2 (p ′ ) is the set of all nonnegative rates satisfying
The maximization is performed over P I1 , the set of all probability distributions given by
and P I2 , the subset in P I1 with Q = ∅, and it suffices to consider |Q| ≤ |X |+4, |U| ≤ |Q|(|X |+3), |T | ≤ |X |·|Ŷ|+2, and |V| ≤ |T |(|X |·|Ŷ| + 1).
Proof: In this scheme, the transmission is split into several blocks and the transmitted message in each block is encrypted fully (R KG2 ) or partially (R KG1 ). The codeword v n is used to convey a description of the feedback signalŷ n from the previous block, and therefore, allows both end users to generate the secret key during the transmission. In R KG1 , the description is sent partially by q n and by u n , thus the presence of the maximum in (3). Refer to Appendix B for further details.
Remark 1: If we set Q = T = V = ∅, we recover the achievable rate of the WTC without feedback.
2) Secret Key Agreement Inner Bound: In the absence of a message, the scheme presented in Theorem 1 may be used by the legitimate users to agree upon a secret key. This key could later be employed to encrypt the transmission or part of it on a higher layer.
Corollary 1: An inner bound on the secret key capacity of the WTC with generalized feedback is given by all nonnegative rates satisfying
subject to
Proof: This corollary is a special case of the strategy in Theorem 1, where there is no message to be transmitted, i.e., R = 0, and we are only interested in generating a secret key. Refer to Appendix C for details.
3) Secrecy Rate Inner Bound Based on Joint SourceChannel Coding:
We now introduce a coding scheme based on a joint source-channel coding strategy where the codewords sent convey both digital and analog information.
This inner bound is presented to expose some shortcomings of Theorem 1. As shown later in Sections IV-E and IV-F, some previously known capacity results are not attained by the KG inner bound but they are recovered by this scheme.
Theorem 2 (JSCC inner bound):
An inner bound on the secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel with generalized feedback is given by all rates satisfying
where the set of all admissible input probability distributions P I3 is given by
with
Proof: The transmission is split into b blocks and, in each block j ∈ [1 : b], the codeword u n [j] sent carries both digital and analog information, the latter through the correlation with sequences from past blocks. The full proof is deferred to Appendix D.
The inner bound in Theorem 2 is complex and hard to evaluate, thus we present the following corollary which will be useful in some comparisons.
Corollary 2:
An inner bound on the secrecy capacity of the WTC with generalized feedback is given by all rates satisfying
where the set of all admissible input PDs P I4 is given by
with |U| ≤ |X | + 2 and |V| ≤ |X |·|Ŷ| + 2.
Proof: It suffices to choose an arbitrarily large b in the JSCC scheme and the following random variables X j ∼ p(x j |u j ), and
where the distributions are the same for each block j. Details are omitted.
Remark 2:
The achievable rate (10) can be independently derived using a simpler block-Markov scheme.
Remark 3:
If we set V = ∅, we recover the achievable rate of the WTC without feedback. On the other hand, it is easy to check that this corollary recovers previous results on secure DoF in [5] .
B. Wiretap Channel with Parallel Sources 1) Secrecy Rate Outer Bound for a Class of Channels:
For the specific channel model depicted in Fig. 2 , we derive the following outer bound on the secrecy capacity.
Theorem 3:
An outer bound on the secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel with parallel sources is given by all nonnegative rates satisfying
where the set of all input probability distributions is given by
with |U| ≤ |X c |, |T | ≤ |Ŷ s | + 1, and |V| ≤ (|Ŷ s | + 1) 2 . Proof: Refer to Appendix E.
Remark 4:
In the absence of the correlated sources, the bound (11) collapses to the outer bound of the wiretap channel.
2) Secret Key Agreement Outer Bound for a Class of Channels:
Let us now consider that, in the scenario depicted in Fig. 2 , the legitimate users want to agree upon a secret key by means of the correlated sources and the communication through the wiretap channel.
Theorem 4: An outer bound on the secret key capacity of this channel model is given by all nonnegative rates satisfying
where P o is the set of all input probability distributions given by (12) . Proof: Refer to Appendix F. Remark 5: The outer bound is the union of the secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel p(y c z c |x c ), the first two terms on the right-hand side of (13), and the secret key capacity of the WTC with a public noiseless channel and correlated sources [17, Thm. 2.6], the other two terms in (13) .
IV. CAPACITY RESULTS FOR SOME CHANNEL AND FEEDBACK MODELS
In this section, we first present new capacity results obtained by the KG inner bound for the wiretap channel with parallel sources. Next, we show that previously reported results for other types of channel and feedback models are recovered by this scheme as well. Finally, two examples are presented where the JSCC scheme is optimal while the KG scheme is not.
A. Secret Key Capacity for the WTC with Parallel Sources
We first analyze the secret key agreement problem in the model depicted in Fig. 2 , where the nodes have access to correlated sources independent of the main channel. The outer bound for this model is found in Theorem 4, whereas the inner bound is derived from Corollary 1 by taking the set of variables (2) and restricting the input probability distributions to the form (cf. (12))
Then, the achievable secret key rate (6) is given by
This bound is tight in some special cases.
1) Eve Has a Less Noisy Channel:
If Eve has a less noisy channel than Bob, no secrecy can be obtained from the main channel and the secret key is generated through the correlated sources.
Proposition 1: In this scenario, the secret key capacity is given by
Proof: For a given PD in (12) and given the less noisy condition on Eve's channel, i.e., I(U ; Y c ) ≤ I(U ; Z c ) for any RV U such that U − − X c − − (Y c Z c ), the outer bound from Theorem 4 reduces to (18)- (19) which is equal to the inner bound (16)- (17) with Q = ∅ and U = X c .
Remark 6:
The secret key capacity of the WTC with a public noiseless channel of rate R [17, Thm. 2.6] is a special case of Proposition 1, where X c = Y c = Z c and H(X c ) = R. This result was also noted in [31, Thm. 1].
2) Eve Has a Less Noisy Side Information:
If Eve has a less noisy side information than Bob, the legitimate users cannot extract any secret bits from the correlated sources; the key is the message carried by the codeword u n (·), which is secured from Eve by Wyner's wiretap coding scheme.
Proposition 2:
In this scenario, the secret key capacity is given by
Proof: Given the less noisy condition on Eve's side information, i.e.,
, the outer bound reduces to (20) and the condition (14) disappears. Additionally, the inner bound (16)- (17) achieves (20) with Q = T = V = ∅.
Remark 7:
Since the side information cannot be used to generate a secret key, the secret key capacity (20) is equal to the secrecy capacity of the WTC.
3) Alice and Bob Have the Same Side Information:
If the legitimate users have access to the same side information, there is no need to transmit the bin indices of the description.
Proposition 3:
Proof: IfŶ s = Y s , the cost of transmitting the bin indices disappears, i.e., I(V ;Ŷ s |Y s ) = 0, which renders the conditions (14) and (17) redundant and both the outer and inner bounds become
where (22a) follows from the Markov chain T − −V − −Y s − −Z s , which is due toŶ s = Y s , and Q = ∅ in the inner bound; and where in (22b) we maximize the mutual information with V = Y s .
B. Secrecy Capacity for the WTC with Parallel Sources
We now analyze the secrecy capacity for the model depicted in Fig. 2 . The outer bound for this model is found in Theorem 3, whereas the inner bound can be derived from Theorem 1 by taking the set of variables (2) and restricting the input probability distributions to the form (15) . Then, the achievable rate R KG1 (3) is given by
and R KG2 (4) by
1) Eve Has a Less Noisy Channel:
As in Section IV-A1, if Eve has a less noisy channel than Bob, the secrecy rate is only due to the secret key generated through the correlated sources.
Proposition 4: In this scenario, the secrecy capacity is
Proof: For a probability distribution in (12) and given the less noisy condition on Eve's channel, the outer bound from Theorem 3 reduces to (25) which is equal to the inner bound (24) with U = X c .
2) Eve Has a Less Noisy Side Information:
If Eve has a less noisy side information than Bob, the legitimate users cannot extract any secret bits from the correlated sources, and this problem reduces to the wiretap channel.
Proposition 5: In this scenario, the secrecy capacity is
Proof: Given the less noisy condition on Eve's side information, the bound (11a) becomes (26) while the bound (11b) becomes redundant. The bound (26) is achieved by the inner bound (23) with Q = T = V = ∅.
3) Alice and Bob Have the Same Side Information and Bob Has a Less Noisy Channel:
Unlike Section IV-A3, in order to achieve capacity the legitimate users not only have to share the same side information but also Bob needs a less noisy channel than Eve.
Proposition 6: In this scenario, the secrecy capacity is
Proof: IfŶ s = Y s , the cost of transmitting the bin indices disappears, i.e., I(V ;Ŷ s |Y s ) = 0, and following similar arguments as in (22) the outer bound (11) reduces to
We may further upper-bound part of this expression as follows:
where the inequality is due to Bob's channel being less noisy than Eve's. The outer bound thus becomes (27) under the mentioned conditions which is achieved by the inner bound (23) with Q = T = ∅, V = Y s , and U = X c .
C. Wiretap Channel with Perfect Output Feedback
In [10] , the authors analyze a wiretap channel with perfect output feedback at the encoder, i.e.,Ŷ = Y , and perfectly secured from the eavesdropper.
Theorem 5 ([10, Thm. 1]):
In this model, the KG scheme presented in Theorem 1 achieves all rates satisfying:
Proof: With the following choice of RVs
while the rate R KG2 (4) reads
Therefore, the union of both regions can be succinctly written as (29) .
Remark 8:
The secrecy capacity results for the degraded and reversely degraded WTC with perfect output feedback [10, Cor. 1 and 2] also apply here.
Remark 9:
If we set V = Y in the rate expression of Corollary 2, which given the perfect feedback seems to be the maximizing V , we obtain
which is strictly below (29) provided that I(U ; Y ) < I(U ; Z).
D. Wiretap Channel with Causal State Information
In [13] , the authors analyze a wiretap channel affected by a random state S, i.e., p(yz|xs)p(s), when the state is available causally only at the encoder and the legitimate decoder, i.e., Y = S and Y = (Y, S).
Theorem 6 ([13, Thm. 1]):
In this model, the KG scheme presented in Theorem 1 achieves all the rates satisfying
Proof: First, we make the choice of RVs V = S and T = Q = ∅. Second, since the state is known causally at the encoder, i.e., s i is present at time slot i, we can modify step 4) from the encoding process (Section B-B) in the following way. For R KG1 , after the encoder has chosen the codeword to transmit in block j, i.e., u n (r j ), it computes u
, s i ) and transmits a randomly generated symbol x i according to
For R KG2 , we proceed similarly but without the inclusion of the function u ′ (·) between the codeword u n (r j ) and the generation of x i . The rate (4) becomes:
Therefore, the final expression for the rate is (31).
Remark 10: The secrecy capacity result for less noisy WTC with state information available causally or noncausally at the encoder and decoder [10, Thm. 3] also applies here.
E. Erasure Wiretap Channel with State-Feedback
In [14] , the authors analyze the erasure WTC with public state-feedback from the legitimate receiver; therefore, both the encoder and the eavesdropper know if there was an erasure or not at the legitimate end. Moreover, the channels experience independent erasures, i.e., p(yz|x) = p(y|x)p(z|x). In this scenario, it can be shown that the KG scheme from Theorem 1 achieves any rate
where δ denotes the erasure probability of the legitimate receiver and δ E , the one of the eavesdropper. However, this rate is strictly suboptimal as we see next.
Theorem 7 ([14, Cor. 1]):
The secrecy capacity of this channel model is given by
and it is achieved by the JSCC scheme presented in Theorem 2. Proof: In a similar way as [14] , [32] , we divide the transmission in two phases; in the first phase, the legitimate users agree on a key which is then used to secure the second phase.
During the first phase, which comprises b ′ blocks, Alice sends random bits. Bob correctly receives b ′ (1 − δ) bits on average, out of which b ′ (1 − δ)δ E are erasures for Eve. Since Alice knows which bits were received by Bob, they can calculate the same
linear combinations of these bits. For large enough b ′ , treating K as integer has a negligible loss. Hence, the resulting K bits are concatenated to form the key X K . Alice encrypts the sequence of N bits to transmit W N using the key X K , i.e.,
]. Then, the encrypted message gets encoded using a generator matrix G, i.e., W ′′N = W ′N G. This N ×N matrix is publicly known and full-rank. The resulting bits are sent sequentially and, as long as Bob experiences an erasure, the previous bit is repeated. This strategy forces the input variables in the JSCC scheme to be chosen as
where S j−1 b ′ +1 is the state-feedback from the previous blocks of the second phase. This choice of input PD simplifies the rate (8) as
If the length of the key is K = M + M 3/4 , where
the proposed scheme assures that the second term vanishes for sufficiently large N , or equivalently, sufficiently large b since N = bR. We refer the reader to [32] for a complete proof. Hence,
where (40c) is due to W N being independent of the channel outputs in the first phase and the present state; where in (40e)
forms a Markov chain; and (40g) follows from the fact that H(
The length of the first phase can be calculated as follows,
(41c)
where the last equality comes from the most restrictive condition for the rate
or equivalently, b
Replacing this value of b ′ in (40), we obtain the achievable rate for the JSCC scheme (35).
Remark 11:
The capacity result obtained by the JSCC scheme is valid for weak secrecy, i.e., I(M n ; Z n ) ≤ nǫ ′ n , whereas the capacity result in [14, Cor. 1] is also valid for strong secrecy, i.e., I(M n ;
F. AWGN Wiretap Channel with Perfect Output Feedback
In [25] , the authors analyze the Gaussian WTC with perfect output feedback at the encoder, i.e.,Ŷ = Y , and noisy feedback at the eavesdropper. This model can be succinctly described as follows,
where Y j ,Z j , andȲ j are the legitimate receiver's and the eavesdropper's output, and the noisy feedback at time j, respectively. The encoder's signal X j has an average power constraint P , and N j , M j , and S j are arbitrarily correlated additive white Gaussian noise terms with zero means and variances σ 
provided that the eavesdropper has access to the noisy feedbackȲ only, and it is achieved by the JSCC scheme. Proof: We set the joint probability distribution in the JSCC scheme to be:
where α 1 = α 1 + P/σ 2 N and θ ∼ U[−0.5, 0.5] is a continuous random variable. The functions f j (·) in (47) are defined as follows:
The achievable rate (80) can therefore be written as
and we analyze each term in the sequel. The first term,
where inequality (50c) is due to the additional conditioning in the differential entropy; where in (50d) we note that N 1 and X
2 ) are independent of X 1 ; where in (50e) we use some properties of this scheme, namely, Y l is independent of Y l−1 2 and X l is a deterministic function of (X l−1 Y l−1 ), and that h(X 1 ) = log |α 1 |; and where in (50g) we note that for l ∈ [2 : b] X l ∼ N (0, P ) and is independent of N l .
We upper-bound the second term in a similar way as [25] ,
where
T ; and where (51h) follows from the fact that the mutual information is maximized for a Gaussian input distribution with the same variance as θ, which is uniform.
The expression in (51h) has a finite value as long as
where ρ N M , ρ N S , ρ MS are the correlation coefficients between the corresponding noises. If this condition is fulfilled, the following is an achievable rate for this particular choice of variables
which tends to (45) as b → ∞.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this work, we presented two achievable schemes for the wiretap channel with generalized feedback. Each scheme follows a different approach in securing the communication: either by generating a secret key that encrypts the transmitted message or by "beamforming" codewords in a way that is beneficial for the legitimate receiver.
Our main contribution is the first of these two achievable schemes, the KG inner bound, which allows the users to agree on a secret key simultaneously with the transmission of a message. As a corollary to this scheme, we introduced a strategy for the problem of secret key agreement, which is essentially the KG inner bound when no message is transmitted.
Due to the complexity of the general problem, we resorted to simpler channel models to characterize the merit of these schemes. For a special class of channels, which we named wiretap channel with parallel sources, we derived two novel outer bounds and we showed the optimality of the KG inner bound and its corollary under some special conditions. As a side note, it should be mentioned that the capacity result in Proposition 4 was recently re-discovered in [33, Corollary 1] by employing a different coding scheme than our work in [34] .
In addition to these new capacity results, the KG inner bound also recovered previously reported results for different channel and feedback models. Consequently, this inner bound can be seen as a generalization and hence unification of several results in the field.
Nonetheless, the unification is not complete since the KG inner bound failed to recover all known results. We thus introduced the second achievable scheme, the JSCC inner bound, to address this shortcoming. However, the evaluation of this new scheme is cumbersome due to the need to optimize the number of blocks b in addition to the auxiliary random variables. Hence, it remains to be seen whether any of the two achievable schemes outperforms the other in a general scenario. This analysis will be the focus of future work.
APPENDIX A STRONGLY TYPICAL SEQUENCES AND DELTA-CONVENTION
Following [30] , we use in this paper strongly typical sets and the so-called Delta-Convention. Some useful facts are recalled here. Let X and Y be random variables on some finite sets X and Y, respectively. We denote by P X,Y (resp. P Y |X , and P X ) the joint probability distribution of (X, Y ) (resp. conditional distribution of Y given X, and marginal distribution of X).
Definition 3: For any sequence x n ∈ X n and any symbol a ∈ X , notation N (a|x n ) stands for the number of occurrences of a in x n . Definition 4: A sequence x n ∈ X n is called (strongly) δ-typical w.r.t. X (or simply typical if the context is clear) if
and N (a|x n ) = 0 for each a ∈ X such that P X (a) = 0. The set of all such sequences is denoted by T n δ (X).
for each a ∈ X , b ∈ Y, and N (a, b|x n , y n ) = 0 for each a ∈ X , b ∈ Y such that P Y |X (b|a) = 0. The set of all such sequences is denoted by T n δ (Y |x n ). Delta-Convention [30] : For any sets X , Y, there exists a sequence {δ n } n∈N * such that lemmas below hold. 1 From now on, typical sequences are understood with δ = δ n . Typical sets are still denoted by T n δ (·).
Lemma 1 ([30]):
There exists a sequence η n − −−− → n→∞ 0 such that
Lemma 2 ([30]):
There exists a sequence η n − −−− → n→∞ 0 such that, for each
Lemma 3 (Asymptotic equipartition property):
There exists a sequence η n − −−− → n→∞ 0 such that, for each x n ∈ T n δ (X) and each y n ∈ T n δ (Y |x n ),
Lemma 4 (Joint typicality lemma [30] ): There exists a sequence η n − −−− → n→∞ 0 such that
APPENDIX B PROOF OF THEOREM 1 (KG INNER BOUND)
The encoder splits the transmission in b blocks of n time slots, during which it transmits b − 1 messages of rate R. The region R KG1 is obtained by the joint use of Wyner's wiretap scheme and an encryption key generated through the feedback link, whereas R KG2 only relies on the aforementioned encryption key. If the eavesdropper is able to correctly decode the channel codeword, the second scheme obtains higher rates. In the sequel, we show the proof for R KG1 , while the proof of R KG2 is deferred to the end.
A. Codebook Generation
Let us define the quantities
and fix the joint distribution (5) that achieves the maximum in R KG1 . Then, for each block, create independent codebooks as follows: 1) Generate 2
. Distribute the sequences uniformly at random in 2 nS1 equal-size bins B 1 (l 1 ), which is possible sinceS 1 ≤ S 1 . 4) For each pair (u n (r), t n (l ′ , s 1 )), generate 2 nS2 conditionally independent sequences v n (r, s 1 , s 2 ), where s 1 ) ). Distribute the sequences uniformly at random in 2 nS2 equal-size bins B 2 (s 1 , l 2 ) and the sequences in each bin in 2 nS2 equal-size sub-bins B 2 (s 1 , l 2 , k). This binning process is feasible if
which holds under (54) as long as I(V ; Z|U T ) ≤ I(V ; Y |U T ).
See Fig. 3 for details.
B. Encoding
In block 1, the encoder chooses a codeword u n (r 1 ) uniformly at random. It then transmits the associated jointly typical sequence x n (r 1 ) that is randomly generated according to the PD p(x n |u n (r 1 )) = n i=1 p(x i |u i (r 1 )). In block j ∈ [2 : b] proceed as follows: 1) Given the channel input and the feedback signal from the previous block, the encoder looks for an index s 1(j−1) ≡ s 1 such that
where δ ′ < ǫ. If more than one index is found, choose the smallest one. The probability of not finding such an index is arbitrarily small as n → ∞. 2) Moreover, the encoder looks for an index s 2(j−1) ≡ŝ 2 such that
where δ ′ < ǫ. If more than one index is found, choose the smallest one. The probability of not finding such an index is arbitrarily small as n → ∞. 3) Let the sequences t n (l
, and define the following two mappings. First, let (l
is not necessarily invertible. These two functions can be defined if
(56b) 4) In order to transmit the message m j = (m 0j , m 1j ), the encoder chooses uniformly at random a value for the index l f j ∈ [1 : 2 nR f ] and selects the codeword
It then transmits the associated jointly typical sequence x n (r j ), generated on the fly.
B2(l2, 1)B2(l2, 2 nS 2 ) Fig. 3 . Schematic representation of the codebook. The index s 1 in the bins and sub-bins of v n (·) is not shown to improve readability.
C. Decoding
In block j ∈ [2 : b] proceed as follows:
1) The legitimate decoder looks for the unique set of indices
The probability of error in decoding can be made arbitrarily small provided that
3) The legitimate decoder looks for the unique index
where δ <ǫ 1 . The probability of error in decoding is arbitrarily small as n → ∞. 4) The legitimate decoder additionally looks for the unique index s 2(j−1) ≡ŝ 2 such that v n (r j−1 , s 1(j−1) ,ŝ 2 ) ∈ B 2 (s 1(j−1) , l 2(j−1) ) and
where δ <ǫ 2 . The probability of error in decoding is arbitrarily small as n → ∞. 5) The legitimate decoder is then able to recover the secret key k
, and with this key, it decrypts the message, i.e., m j = (m 0j , m
D. Key Leakage
Let us denote with L 1j the random variable associated with the bin index of codeword T Consider the following,
where (58c) is due to (Z 
The first term in (58f) can be lower-bounded as follows,
where (59a) is due to M
2 nR1 ] and independent of K ′ j ; and where (59c) stems from the following lemma.
Lemma 5: Given the encoding process of Appendix B-B,
where we have dropped the block index [j] for brevity. Proof: The proof is found in Appendix G. The second term in (58f) can be upper-bounded using Fano's inequality since S 2 −S 2 −S 2 < I(V ; Z|U T ), i.e.,
where ǫ n denotes a sequence such that ǫ n → 0 as n → ∞. Therefore, joining (58), (59), and (61), we obtain
and the key is asymptotically secure.
E. Information Leakage Rate
We now proceed to bound the information leakage of the
where the last equality is due to (
The first term in (62) corresponds to the information leakage in block j of the message M 0j given the indices (L ′ j L ′′ j ), which is upper-bounded by nη 1 thanks to (54f). The conditioning over
The second term in (62) can be bounded as follows
, and the data processing inequality; where (63b) is due to (U
nR1 ] and independent of K ′ j . In order to bound (63d), we make use of the following two lemmas.
Lemma 6 ([3, Lemma 2.5]):
Consider a discrete random variable X taking on the mass points x 1 , . . . , x m and with probability mass function satisfying
Then
Lemma 7: Given the encoding process of Appendix B-B, the probability of the index L 2j can be bounded as follows
where β is a normalization constant independent of the value of L 2j . Proof: Refer to Appendix H.
Lemma 7 allows us to write,
. Therefore, according to Lemma 6,
and
which let us bound (63), and in turn, (62),
Now consider,
The
) and M 1j , while the second term can be bounded as follows
where (71a) is because the following Markov chain
The third term in (70) is upper-bounded as follows
where the last inequality is bounded exactly as (63b). Thus, (70) is upper-bounded as
Finally, the total information leakage rate is
which assures that the eavesdropper has no knowledge of the messages asymptotically.
F. Sufficient Conditions (R KG1 )
Putting all pieces together, we have proved that the proposed scheme allows the encoder to transmit a message uniformly distributed in [1 : 2 nR ], R = R KG1 = R 0 + R 1 , while keeping it secret from the eavesdropper if
where ǫ 12 = ǫ 1 + ǫ 2 +ǫ 1 +ǫ 2 . After applying Fourier-Motzkin elimination we obtain the bounds in (3) subject to
Nonetheless, these conditions are redundant after the maximization process. If for a certain PD, condition (72a) is not satisfied, then, R KG1 with T = V = ∅ attains a higher value. Similarly, if either (72b) or (72c) does not hold for a certain PD, then, R KG2 with Q = ∅ attains a higher value. The bounds on the cardinality of the alphabets Q, U, T , and V follow from Fenchel-Eggleston-Carathéodory's theorem and the standard cardinality bounding technique [30, Appendix C], therefore their proof is omitted.
G. Inner Bound R KG2
This second strategy tackles the situation where the eavesdropper experiences a better channel than the legitimate receiver and can therefore decode everything sent by the encoder. In R KG1 , when either the condition (72b) or (72c) is not satisfied, the rate of the unencrypted message (R 0 ) is negative. Therefore, in this second strategy the message is encrypted completely. The proof is similar to the one of R KG1 and we only point out the differences in the sequel.
1) Codebook Generation:
Since the eavesdropper is able to decode everything, there is no need for the codeword q n (·) as a lower layer for u n (·), which in turn makes the bit recombina-
, l 2(j−1) ) unnecessary. Additionally, since the encoder cannot send the message without encrypting it, R 0 = 0 and R f = 0, and the condition (54f) disappears. We therefore take the joint distribution (5) with Q = ∅ and build the codebooks for each block as in Appendix B-A without q n (·) and with t n (·) superimposed over u n (·). The quantities (54) are modified as follows:
2) Encoding and Decoding: These steps are analogous to the previous proof with two main differences. First, there is no bit recombination in the transmission of the bin index. Second, the encoder only sends an encrypted message m ′ j = m j ⊕ k ′ j−1 using the key obtained from the feedback of the previous block. Briefly, if t n (r j−1 , s
3) Key and Information Leakage: The proof for the key secrecy is untouched while the one for the information leakage is simplified. Since there is no unencrypted message, i.e., R 0 = 0 the upper-bounding of I(M 
4) Final Expression:
The sufficient conditions in this second strategy for the encoder to transmit a message uniformly distributed in [1 : 2 nR ], R = R KG2 , while keeping it secret from the eavesdropper are given by
which gives us (4) after applying Fourier Motzkin elimination. This concludes the proof of Theorem 1.
APPENDIX C PROOF OF COROLLARY 1 (SECRET KEY AGREEMENT INNER BOUND)
In this scheme, the encoder is not interested in transmitting a message but rather agreeing on a key with the legitimate receiver. As in Theorem 1, the scheme is split in two parts. In the part derived from R KG1 , the key has two components; the first is sent over the channel and is kept secret from the eavesdropper by using Wyner's wiretap scheme, while the second is generated thanks to the correlation between the outputs Y andŶ . On the other hand, only the second method is used in the strategy derived from R KG2 .
A. First Part
This part follows the same steps as R KG1 , see Appendix B, but without the transmission of an encrypted message. The encoder splits the transmission in b blocks of n time slots; at the end of transmission, the encoder and the legitimate receiver will agree with high probability on a key of rate
The proof is similar to the one of R KG1 and we only point out the differences in the sequel.
1) Codebook Generation:
The codebook is generated in the same way as in the strategy R KG1 , with the exception of the codeword u n (·). Specifically, the message m 0 carried by that scheme becomes a part of the secret key here, i.e., R 0 = R k0 , and the key generated through the feedback link is not used to encrypt a message but rather becomes the second part of the secret key, i.e., R 1 = 0, R k1 =S 2 , and R f = I(U ; T Z|Q)−ǫ ′ replaces (54f).
Step 2 in Appendix B-A thus becomes:
2) Encoding and Decoding: These steps are similar to the ones of the scheme R KG1 but no message is transmitted. In each block j ∈ [2 : b], the encoder chooses uniformly at random a key index k 0j ∈ [1 : 2
nR k0 ] and a noise index l f j ∈ [1 : 2 nR f ]. It then sends these indices along with the bin indices (l ′ j , l ′′ j ) of the description of previous block's feedback sequence through the codeword u n (l
3) Key and Information Leakage:
The proof for key leakage of the scheme R KG1 assures that the part of the key that is formed using the description, i.e., k 1 , is kept secret from the eavesdropper, while the proof of information leakage guarantees that the part that is sent through the codeword u n (r), i.e., k 0 , is also secured. Both proofs get simplified since k 1 is not used to encrypt a message and, therefore, is not transmitted. Remark 12 should now state that only the variables L 1j and L 2j are responsible for the correlation between blocks.
4) Final Expression:
The sufficient conditions in this first part of the strategy that allows the legitimate users to agree upon a key uniformly distributed in [1 : 2
nR k ], R k = R k0 + R k1 while keeping it secret from the eavesdropper are
After applying Fourier Motzkin elimination to this set of inequalities we obtain
subject to the conditions (72). However, these conditions are redundant after the maximization process as in R KG1 .
B. Second Part
This part is derived from the strategy R KG2 , where we are only interested in generating a secret key, i.e., R k ≤S 2 . As before, the encoder does not transmit an encrypted message, i.e., R = 0, and the codeword u n (·) is modified accordingly. Refer to Appendix B-G for details.
The sufficient conditions in this second part of the strategy are derived from the bounds (74),
After applying Fourier Motzkin elimination to this system we obtain,
subject to the condition
The union of (75), (76), and (77) can be succinctly written as (6) and (7). This concludes the proof of Corollary 1.
APPENDIX D PROOF OF THEOREM 2 (JSSC INNER BOUND)
The whole transmission is divided into b blocks of n time slots, and we employ joint source-channel coding to convey the message to be sent and the feedback from previous blocks. This strategy allows thus the transmission of both digital and analog information.
2 nR 3 Fig. 4 . Schematic representation of the codebooks for the first three blocks.
A. Codebook Generation
and fix the following joint distribution
Then, for each block, proceed as follows: 
where k j ∈ [1 : 2 nRj ], according to the probability distribution p(u A schematic representation of the codebook construction for the first three blocks is found in Fig. 4 .
B. Encoding
1)
In block 1, let m be the message to be sent. The encoder chooses randomly and uniformly a codeword from the subcodebook C(m), i.e., u n 1 (m, k 1 ). It then sends the associated jointly typical sequence x n 1 (m, k 1 ) that is randomly generated according to the conditional PD p(x
2) For block j ∈ [2 : b], given the past codewords and feedback sequences, the encoder looks for an index k j ≡k such that
If δ ′ ≤ǫ j , the existence of at least one such index is guaranteed by the size ofR j . If several indices are found, choose one randomly and uniformly. The encoder then sends the associated jointly typical sequence x n j (m, k j ) that is randomly generated according to the conditional probability distri-
C. Decoding
The legitimate decoder waits until the last block is received and performs joint decoding of all the sequences, i.e., it looks for the unique index m ≡m such that,
for some k b . The probability of error in the decoding of m can be made arbitrarily small if,
Therefore, the achievable rate is,
where the last equality is due to the Markov chain
The bound on the cardinality of the alphabet U j follows from Fenchel-Eggleston-Carathéodory's theorem and the standard cardinality bounding technique [30, Appendix C], therefore its proof is omitted.
D. Information Leakage Rate
Let us denote with M, L j and K j the random variables associated with the transmitted message m, the bin index l j = B(k j ), and the codeword index k j in block j, respectively.
Consider the following,
where (81a) is due to H(ML
n(R j −R j ); and (81b) stems from the following two lemmas.
Lemma 8: Given the encoding process of Appendix D-B,
Proof: The proof is analogous to the one of Lemma 5, therefore it is not presented.
Lemma 9: Given the encoding process of Appendix D-B,
Proof: Using Fano's inequality, it can be shown that the eavesdropper is able to decode the codewords U 
Since this is verified by the definition ofR j (78), the lemma is proven. Further details are omitted. Now, according to (80),
Therefore, the information leakage rate is upper-bounded by,
which guarantees that the message is hidden from the eavesdropper asymptotically. This concludes the proof of Theorem 2.
APPENDIX E PROOF OF THEOREM 3 (SECRECY RATE OUTER BOUND)
Let R be an achievable secrecy rate according to Definition 1 with the appropriate modifications for the model with parallel sources. Then, there exist functions enc i (·), possibly stochastic, and dec(·) such that
that verify
First consider,
where (90a) is due to the security condition (89); and where (90b) follows from (87), (88), and Fano's inequality,
We now study separately the "source" term R s and the "channel" term R c .
where (91a) is due to Csiszár sum identity; where (91b) follows from the definition of the auxiliary RVs
where in (91c) we introduce the auxiliary RV J uniformly distributed over [1 : n] and independent of all the other variables; and where (91d) stems from the definition of random variables T = (T J J), V = (V J J), Y s = Y sJ , and Z s = Z sJ . This establishes the "source" term in (90c) with auxiliary RVs (V T ) that satisfy the following Markov chain
The first part of (92) is trivial given the definition V i = (M n T i ), whereas the second part follows from the i.i.d. nature of the sources and that they are correlated to the main channel only through the encoder's input (87a),
The "channel" term R c can be single-letterized similarly, 
where ( 
where the nontrivial part is due to the memorylessness property of the channel and (87a). Since neither Q nor U appear on other parts of the outer bound, we may expand R c as 
where in the last step we choose the auxiliary RV U ⋆ ∼ p U|Q (·|q) with the specific q that maximized the preceding expression.
Putting (90), (91), (94), and (96) together, letting n → ∞, and taking arbitrarily small (ǫ n , ǫ ′ n ), we obtain the bound (11a).
In order to obtain (11b), consider the following, 
where (97a) is due to Fano's inequality; where (97b) and (97c) follow fromŶ 
where (98a) stems from the Markov chain Z Putting (97) and (98) together, letting n → ∞, and taking an arbitrarily small ǫ n , we obtain the bound (11b).
Although the definition of the auxiliary RVs (U T V ) used in the proof makes them arbitrarily correlated, the bound (11) only depends on the marginal PDs p(ux c ) and p(tv|ŷ s ). Consequently, we can restrict the set of possible joint PDs to (12) , i.e., independent source and channel variables, and still achieve the maximum.
The bound on the cardinality of the alphabets U, T , and V follow from Fenchel-Eggleston-Carathéodory's theorem and the standard cardinality bounding technique [30, Appendix C] , therefore their proof is omitted. This concludes the proof of Theorem 3.
APPENDIX F PROOF OF THEOREM 4 (SECRET KEY AGREEMENT OUTER BOUND)
Let R k be an achievable secret key rate according to Definition 2. Then, there exist function ψ b (·) and, (possibly stochastic) functions ϕ i (·) and ψ a (·) such that
This proof follows similar steps as the proof presented in Appendix E, thus we only point out the differences. First consider, 
where (102a) is obtained using the same upper-bounding technique of (90); and where (102b) arises from the same procedure as in (91), (94), and (96) but with K n instead of M n . Letting n → ∞, and taking arbitrarily small ǫ ′′ n , we obtain the bound (13) .
In order to obtain (14), we use the following Markov chain that is a consequence of (99a), 
where in the last inequality we use the memoryless property of the channel. s ) ≥ 0 due to (99), (100), Fano's inequality, and the fact that K n is a discrete RV; and where (105d) follows the same steps of (98) with the proper definition for the auxiliary RV V . Putting (104) and (105) together, letting n → ∞, and taking an arbitrarily small ǫ n , we obtain the bound (14) .
Although the definition of the auxiliary RVs (U T V ) used in the proof makes them arbitrarily correlated, the bounds (13) and (14) only depend on the marginal PDs p(ux c ) and p(tv|ŷ s ). Consequently, we can restrict the set of possible joint PDs to (12) , i.e., independent source and channel variables, and still achieve the maximum. This concludes the proof of Theorem 4.
